INTRODUCTION
On-line fault detection and diagnosis is an area with great potential. The ability to detect and isolate a fault as it happens allows immediate decisions to be made about system availability and likelihood of mission completion. In a battlefield environment, for example, This paper is declared a work of the U.S. Government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. The fault detection, isolation, and accommodation (FDIA) method selected here was to integrate an autoassociative neural network into the path of information passed from the sensors back to the controlling entities. Responses to total failure and drift faults have been investigated here. Autoassociative neural networks have the general feature of being able to perform functional mappings. Kramer 8 and Saund 9 have introduced and applied a specific network architecture that is effective for filtering and fault isolation. Among the principal advantages of this approach over competing methods is that identification, isolation, and accommodation can be done with a single passage of information through the network.
T700 SYSTEM OPERATION
The T700 is a turboshaft engine. It is used in the Blackhawk and Apache helicopter airframes. The principal input from the cockpit is the percent of collective stick. Engine operation is controlled by the Table 1 .
Examples of the potentially catastrophic response of traditional controllers to sensor faults can be readily simulated. The simulated response of a T700 engine without FDIA to a sudden loss of sensed compressor exit pressure (Ps3) is shown in Figure 2 in the form of histories of critical engine parameters. The immediate effect of a loss in sensed compressor exit pressure is a loss in fue] flow (wf) from the hydromechanical unit (HMU). Sc nsed P_ drives a lever mechanism in the HMU. The mechanism has the function of creating the appropriatt,, fuel flow past a metering valve by 
Selection of bottleneck layer size
A critical value in applying the dimensionality reduction approach to a particular problem is the number of nodes in the bottleneck layer. If the number of nodes is greater than the system degrees of freedom, errant sensor information may be unnecessarily passed through the bottleneck layer. If the number is smaller than the degrees of freedom, the network outputs cannot adequately reconstruct the system behavior due to insufficient information having been passed through the bottleneck layer. One approach to finding the number of system degrees of freedom would be to use the equations governing the system to fred the functional relations among them. Another is to examine and compare the performance of various network architectures.
This can be particularly useful if (as is the case with the TT00 engine system) more than one function is used to characterize these relationships depending upon the location within the operating envelope.
Networks having different numbers of bottleneck nodes were trained on the same data set for the same number of epochs. It is anticipated that, below a certain number of bottleneck nodes, the sum of squared errors will have a distinctly larger minimum on account of the loss of critical information passing through the bottleneck.
A comparison of the sums of squared errors as a function of epoch number is shown in Figure 4 . Several trainings of each network architecture were performed using random initial guesses for nodal weights and biases in order to avoid training to a local error minimum. Based on these results, the appropriate bottleneck size was determined to be four nodes.
Although the five-noded case had smaller error after the selected number of epochs, the error trend suggests the four-noded case could have been trained further to achieve the same error. Additionally, because of the similarity in the results among the four-and five-noded cases and the marked difference from the three noded case, it appears likely that the four-noded case passes the minimum amount of information for construction of an input vector estimate.
Training AL_proach
The selected network is both nonlinear and multilayered. As such, it will likely have local minima in its error surface. To ensure convergence to a global minimum, large momentum was included. Nyguen-Widrow 'a initial guesses for weights and biases and variable learning rate were also included to speed up convergence.
Training data were generated from runs Table 1 .
Training was performed in two steps. First, preliminary weights and biases were generated by training on a data set of 88 unSaulted engine output vectors for approximately 12,000 epochs. These weights and biases were used as initial guesses for a second training round in which vectors containing both faulted and unfaulted values were presented as input. In this set of 704 vectors, 88% contained a fault in one sensed value.
With the exception of No, these faults were randomly biased by 10 to 100% of the uafaulted values. Because Np is to remain nearly constant over the entire T700 operating envelope, the random perturbations in it ranged up to 10%. The second training required approximately 25,000 epochs. At the termination of training, the root-mean-squared error between input and output vector elements was approximately 4%.
Intearation into T700 Simulator The test bed was adapted from the simulation used to generate training data. '4 Subroutines for fault injection were inserted at points where sensed values were calculated. Up to three faults of preset type can be injected at scheduled times. The vector of sensed values enters the network at each time step, every 0.006 seconds. If any estimated value differs from the corresponding input value by more than a preset threshold, the estimate rather than the sensed value is passed to the controller.
For all subsequent time steps, the network takes as input the estimated values for any faulted sensors from the previous time step. Thus a sensor, once determined to be faulted, is removed from future calculations.
A schematic of the fault creation and checking function integrated into the flow of information among the program modules representing the engine, HMU, and ECU is shown in Figure 5 . Engine response to demand changes in presence of a sensor fault Once a sensor fault has been detected and accommodated, the engine will likely be expected to appropriately respond to subsequent changes in load demand. This was examined for two fault cases: the first in the trim signal and the second in compressor exit pressure.
A negative ramp fault was injected for the trim signal case. These results are shown in Figure 9 . Prior to fault detection, the HMU interprets this signal as a demand to increase fuel flow to compensate for a power turbine underspeed. As a result, the power turbine actually accelerates. When the fault is detected in the trim signal, the substituted value is larger and constant. The result is that the power turbine equilibrates to a steady overspeed Value. At 5 seconds, the torque load on the output shaft is increased. The power turbine decelerates to below the design speed. For the power turbine to return to _m, the dynamic character of the trim signal is very iml:ortant. As mentioned earlier, the dynanfic character of the trim signal during load demand changes is aot captured by the steady state network training. The estimated trim signal does not increase enough to bring the engine back to trim. While a steady state is reached, the power delivered does not increase.
A hard fau t in compressor exit pressure at 0.25 seconds is examine! in the second case. The results are shown in Figure 13 . The fault is immediately detected. The substituted pressure is larger than the actual value. This has an immediate effect of increasing fuel flow and power turbine speed shortly thereafter. The ECU then acts to bring the engine back to trim. Due to the positive bias between actual compressor pressure and estimated compressor pressure, however, the system goes into a limit cycling mode as the HMU overschedi les fuel flow and the ECU acts in correction. It should be noted here that the second case is identical to the one described to demonstrate the system response to a sensor fault without validation ( Figure 2 ). The sensor validation scheme applied here was effective at maintaining stable engine behavior where the consequences would otherwise likely have been catastrophic.
When load demand is increased in the presence of a compressor exit pressure sensor fault, the result with sensor validation (Figure 10 ) is closer to healthy engine behavior ( Figure 6 ) than is the trim signal sensor fault case ( Figure 9 ). The power turbine briefly tmderspeeds and the system parameters oscillate as the ECU hunts for a new equilibrium. The principal feature distinguishing the post acceleration behavior in this case from the healthy engine is that the engine limit cycles whereas in the healthy case the oscillations decayed. The mean power delivered in the two cases, however, agree to within fractions of a percent. signal from the former is used by the HMU while that of the latter is used by the ECU. The results are shown in Figure 11 . Similar to previous cases, compressor exit pressure undergoes a hard fault at 0.25 seconds.
The limit cycling response is as before. At 5.0 seconds, a hard power turbine speed sensor fault of 50% of actual speed is injected. It is immediately detected.
Substitution with estimated speed distinctly reduces the oscillations in system parameters because the speed error inferred by the ECU is small and comparatively steady. The estimated power turbine speed is below the design speed. The ECU acts to accelerate the power turbine until the estimated value agrees with the design value. At steady state, the power turbine has in fact oversped by 0.8 %.
Other fault combinations have yet to be tested. It is expected that combinations which include the trirn signal will be problematic due to the inability of the present FDIA to recreate the necessary dynamic trim signal behavior.
CONCLUDING REMARKS An autoassociative neural network has been created that maps normal T700 engine behavior to within tolerance thresholds over a wide range of torque demands and engine inlet conditions. This network has been integrated into a component-based real-time simulation and is effective at detecting sensor faults and substituting appropriate estimated sensor values given anappropriate selection of fault thresholds. Among the issues yet to be addressed is the selection of tolerances to adequately identify faults from each sensor over a variety of flight conditions. Generally, the integration of a neural network-based sensor validation scheme into the dosed loop engine operation resulted in stable engine behavior in response to faults. Hard sensor faults in any one of the sensed quantities were correctly detected and accommodated.
System response in ramped cases depended upon the comparative sizes of fault detection thresholds.
Unaccommodated, these sensor faults would have been catastrophic to the engine and airframe. The behavior around the time of variable substitution of the system with the integrated neural network is as expected m terms of engine and controller response. While the network embedded in the control has been shown to accommodate multiple sensor faults, this is not necessarily true of all multiple fault combinations.
Future work might involve network training to include engine dynamic response and discrimination between sensor and system faults. Swategies for threshold selection might also be investigated, with respect to both minimization of misdiagnoses and engine-toengine variation.
